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Abstract 
Given the multiple problems presented by food policy, food security presents a complex 
dilemma for policy makers. This paper examines the contradictions presented by competing 
food security, food self-sufficiency, and food sovereignty framings, the challenge of policy 
making across multiple levels amidst competing agendas of agricultural commodity 
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production and production for self-provisioning populations, and the need to balance 
economic development with sustainable food production. From an analysis of rice, palm oil 
and sugar cases in Indonesia, we conclude that the conflicted nature of food policy needs to 
be understood in terms of the way specific material and ideational, actor-specific and 
structural factors working across scale shape outcomes in a highly uneven fashion. We find 
that this produces a policy field highly resistant to single analytical approaches, opening up 
the wide range of internally conflicting, related policy questions encompassed by food 
security related policy 
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Introduction  
Food security has become an umbrella concept used for covering a variety of processes and 
strategies aimed at improving availability, access, stability or utilization of food (FAO 1983). 
However, given the sectorial nature of policy making, analysts rarely consider these four 
pillars of food security simultaneously, with many policy discussions concentrating on 
specific policy measures for achieving one particular policy objective related to food security. 
Such a partial approach may lose sight of the encompassing dilemmas related to food 
security.  
Food security related policy is further complicated by issues of governance and power. 
Ambiguities and lack of clarity surround authority over setting policy directions and making 
decisions in a (legal-) normative way, even though laws specify the institutions and actors 
who have the legal authority to steer food security policies (Meadowcroft 2007). 
Furthermore, given the sectorial nature of policy making, in practice policy actors may have 
limited power to shape the overall policy field, despite the normative assumptions set out by 
the authoritative legal institutions responsible for steering the policy areas. For this reason 
food policy governance tends to be fragmented. Moreover, food security is not only a policy 
field characterized by a gap between national policies and local practices, but also a clear 
example of the production and politics of scale (Gellert 2008, 44). The global, national and 
local are not self-evident scales of administration, but instead 'scalar configurations that are 
the outcome of sociospatial processes that regulate and organize social power relations' 
(Swyngedouw 2004, 132). In the cases discussed below such sociospatial processes include 
the decentralisation policies, the growing influence of international market forces and 
nationalistic politics in the national parliament. 
In this paper we will provide a situated discussion of food security policy, analyzing the food 
security agenda in some specific contexts, and exploring how key factors and actors influence 
outcomes, contrasting grounded contextual realities with the normative debate. 
To illustrate this dilemma we focus on one national context - Indonesia. Here we are 
concerned with understanding the problem of policy coherence: how do the material and the 
ideational dimensions of power work together across scale and jurisdictional levels to shape 
the way food security policy works in practice? We will proceed in two stages. First, we 
discuss national policies, with their traditional focus on rice, and recent policy developments 
following the 2012 food law. Second, we present two case studies that contrast local level 
dilemmas, and the national food security policies and legislation. The two cases concern key 
commodity production systems in which a cash crop sector competes with staple food 
cultivation, presenting the problem of balancing economic development with sustainable food 
production in the cultivation areas. In the first case, generating export earnings from a 
booming agricultural commodity competes with the need to promote national rice self-
sufficiency, together with the self-provisioning of rice farmers. The second case points to the 
competing aims of achieving national sugar self-sufficiency that competes with the challenge 
of mitigating food insecurity for the most vulnerable. Here, the autonomous governments of 
adjacent districts with differing value orientations and priorities further complicate food 
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security related policies. In the final section we return to the key questions presented by this 
complex policy problem.  
 
The Conflicted Nature of Food Security Policy 
Food security is a ‘wicked’ policy domain that is highly resistant to traditional linear, 
analytical approaches, and involves complex policy issues that include a variety of internally 
conflicting related policy goals (Rittel and Weber 1973). As noted earlier, working in one 
direction can create new barriers for reaching another policy objective. Moreover, 
institutional complexity emerges with specialized government institutions or Ministries, each 
with their own implementation programs and their own criteria for measuring progress. 
Additionally, particular stakeholders have different understandings of the nature and extent of 
the problem: in the absence of consensus regarding the nature of the problem and its causes, 
there can be no agreement over the appropriate solution. The greater the diversity of views, 
interests and agendas among the various parties, the more complex the attempt to develop 
coherent policy (Conklin 2006, 14). Acknowledging the wicked nature of food security 
policy does not make it easier to find solutions to problems; however, considering food 
security challenges as 'tame' (the opposite of wicked) problems will at best provide short term 
solutions which will not last.  
How are the problems related to food security defined? In the academic debate about food 
security we can broadly distinguish four approaches. The first emphasizes the urgency of the 
subject by stressing that, worldwide, we face a food crisis. This policy narrative frames this 
as a problem of supply and demand at the international and national scales, and focuses on 
proximate factors of supply. It presents a production-oriented approach emphasizing the need 
to increase production, characteristically by applying technical capital intensive solutions in 
agriculture (Jarosz 2014, 169). Often there is an emphasis on market-driven approaches to the 
achievement of policy goals, with advocates of this approach assuming that the government 
just has a supporting steering or enabling role. This approach can support free trade, allowing 
cheap food commodities import to secure affordable prices for urban consumers. National 
governments may also provide enabling policy for agribusiness – for instance creating 
incentives for investment. Yet, for critics, supporting corporate, large scale approaches to 
food system development and research runs the risk of downplaying the social and ecological 
impacts of market based food policies in the Global South (Via Campesina 2001, Jarosz 
2011). Moreover, when taken to its extreme this approach may neglect inequities in 
distribution and access to increased food production across various layers of society. 
A second approach accepts the premises of the productivist paradigm, but privileges food 
self-sufficiency. As we will discuss further below, this approach emerges from concerns 
regarding food in-security within a national context. Responding to fears that individuals will 
not have sufficient access to food, and that the nation will depend on unreliable international 
markets, food self-sufficiency can be a policy objective at various levels: national, district 
and household.  
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A third set of approaches, building on the work of Sen, emphasizes the contextual, situational 
nature of food insecurity at the household level (Swift 1989, Sen 1997). This approach 
focuses on the need to understand how household level entitlement failures shape the 
inability of the poor to access sufficient food, taking into account a range of factors that affect 
rural livelihoods including the political economy and social structures, natural resource 
endowments and climatic factors that shape agricultural production systems. This third 
approach suggests an agenda for assuring food security for vulnerable, poor populations – 
focused at the household level, including protective measures for securing the income of 
small farmers and providing safety nets for those who spend the highest proportion of their 
budget on food. 
Fourth, La Via Campesina and other NGOs including their Indonesian network partner 
WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) advocate food sovereignty. They have criticized the 
fact that 'access to food is seen as only the people’s ability to purchase food, not their right to 
food' (Jakarta Post 2011). A declaration of Via Campesina (2001) states that ‘the basic human 
right to food can only be realized in a system where food sovereignty is guaranteed, meaning 
the right of peoples to define their own food and agricultural policies as well as the right to 
produce their basic foods in a manner respecting cultural and productive diversity.’  
These four approaches have emerged partly in opposition to each other, but also as a 
consequence of the specific interests of institutions in the field of food production and policy. 
Jarosz (2014, 175) signaled that recently the discourses on food security and food sovereignty 
have been converging. She also argues that in order to understand the actual food policies in 
place in a specific context requires analysis of the dynamic operation of power through and 
across the political economy of food networks (Jarosz 2014, 177). In pursuit of this, this 
paper presents two case studies from Indonesia. While both cases take place under the 
shadow of the same national policy regime, each is affected by the specific actors and 
political-economic dynamics that encompass two major export crops. The focus of the case 
studies is on identifying the powerful actors, investigating their discourses and activities in 
the field, and explaining the outcomes related to the various goals of the food security debate.  
 
Actors and power 
 
The resolution of food security questions is not in the hands of a single actor: it is of concern 
to non-state, supra-state, and sub-state actors, in particular civil society, international 
governmental organizations, and transnational corporations (Fuchs 2007, 1). Although the 
Indonesian Food Law (discussed below) might grant the ultimate authority for food policy to 
a national agency, in practice agribusiness, district government agencies, land owners and 
users shape food production. Their power to effect land use decisions varies across scale, 
with outcomes for vulnerable households often shaped by a mixture of structural and 
contextual factors. On this note, Fuchs and Glaab (2011) emphasize ‘the impact of material 
and ideational, actor-specific and structural sources of power and their interaction on the 
ability of actors to influence agri-food governance' (Fuchs and Glaab 2011, 230). Material 
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sources of power include financial means to invest in the project but also to hire expertise. 
For instance, a company or international NGO can use its material resources to shape 
political agendas, when those who take the formal decisions depend on employment 
opportunities and financial support or investment. When a company is the single buyer of a 
crop, as in the case of a sugar mill, it has structural material power with respect to other 
stakeholders. At the same time we need to account for 'ideational sources of power' which 
include: 
the normative dimension of power and identifies an actor’s ability to influence the 
framing of political issues as a crucial asset. Accordingly, an actor can exercise 
discursive power on the definition of policies, actors, and norms and procedures 
(Fuchs and Glaab 2011, 731). 
Ideational power is important in local level decision making on food production projects in 
several ways. First, laws and policy narratives legitimize the authority that actors claim along 
with access to budgets, land, and other resources. For example, villagers can exert their 
authority by claiming customary rights to the land and justifying why they are to be regarded 
as landowners. In this way they assert control over agricultural land, the crucial natural 
resource in food production. Alternatively, corporate investors can promote their own 
investment strategies by indicating how the yields to be obtained from capital intensive, high 
input agriculture will be combined with local subsistence land uses. A key source of power is 
access to knowledge. Knowledge about the potentials of crops and possible future scenarios 
of local economic development are important inputs in the decision making process. For 
farmers, knowledge about farming technologies and market prices highly influences their 
decisions on what to cultivate. The discussion on the case studies below will explore how 
analysis of power relations according to the material and ideational dimensions of actors’ 
power and their interaction helps for understanding how food security policy works in 
practice. With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to the empirical questions. What 
has been food security policy in practice in Indonesia? How did local actors shape these 
policies in the concrete cases of districts involved in oil palm or sugarcane cultivation?  
 
National food security policies in Indonesia 
Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia, with a population of 253 million in 2014 
(CIA 2014). It is an archipelago with a variety of climatic and geological conditions. Some of 
the areas are wet humid tropics with high annual rainfall, whereas other parts of the country 
are semi-arid, with rainfall of less than 1000 mm. The main staple food is rice, cultivated on 
flat land with sufficient access to water. The major cultivation centers of oil palm, the most 
significant agricultural export crop, lie in the humid areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan. A 
major regime change in 1998 ended a 32 period of centralized rule by President Suharto and 
brought a new period of democratization. Administratively, the country is divided into 
provinces that are subdivided into over 500 districts and municipalities in total (BPS 2015); 
since 2001, the district governments have a large extent of autonomy for policymaking in the 
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field of agriculture and food provision and the crucial authority for issuing land permits that 
agribusiness companies require in their land acquisition process. National food and 
agricultural policies create the legal framework that directs the actions of actors in the field.  
 
Policy priorities 
 
To understand food security policies in Indonesia it is necessary to go back two or three 
decades. During the Suharto regime food security and food self-sufficiency were important 
pillars of economic development, forming a key element of a productivist supply orientated 
approach that pursued food security related policies to further national stability. To that end 
the state established institutions to buy and to distribute food to stabilize prices at the farm 
gate and also for consumers. This was to be achieved by the state logistic agency BULOG 
(Timmer 1996). During this green revolution period, the state invested heavily in increasing 
production, by guaranteeing the availability of cheap inputs for rice production, through 
subsidizing fertilizers and seeds, and establishing credit programs for small farmers (Timmer 
2005). The state also developed irrigation schemes and other key infrastructure. A special 
government agency, Badan Pengendali BIMAS (the Mass Control and Guidance Agency)) 
coordinated the agricultural intensification programs in a top down fashion. This policy 
culminated when the nation achieved self-sufficiency for some time in the 1980s (Dawe 
2014) not only in rice but also several other foods. It controlled the marketing margin 
between a ceiling and a floor price, effectively stabilizing price fluctuations in size and over 
time. During this period BULOG was able to stabilize prices at around the world price (Dawe 
2012). The government's policy was popular because both farmers and poor consumers, 
especially the urban poor, felt that their interests were being protected. 
Since the 1990s domestic rice production has not been sufficient to meet the demand for 
domestic consumption. Imports have been fluctuating, with a peak during the time of the East 
Asian economic crisis, the El Nino year 1998 when the Suharto regime fell. After an 
agreement with the IMF, the government liberalized rice policy. BIMAS was abolished, and 
extension services fell under the jurisdiction of the district government instead of the national 
Ministry of Agriculture. BULOG changed its function, and village cooperatives no longer 
functioned as before. At the village level private intermediaries dominated local rice markets 
in a monopsony fashion, which negatively affected the margins for rice farmers. At the same 
time state agencies no longer ensured that rice prices tracked international prices. After the 
imposition of seasonal import restrictions in 2004, rice prices increased by almost 80% 
(McCollough 2008), moving well above world prices. According to analyses of the trend in 
real prices as measured in the field, the gap between the farm gate price and the consumer 
price has been getting wider. Farmers have been receiving less due to lower prices, while 
consumers simultaneously had to pay higher prices with intermediate traders capturing 
profits. This increased poverty among farmers and laborers (Zen 2013, 190-197). 
Consequently, food security remains a highly political issue, particularly during elections. 
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Currently rice production is lagging, and analysts mention three main reasons: low 
productivity, a decreasing area of paddy fields due to urbanisation or conversion to more 
rewarding land use, and harvest failure due to reasons that are often associated with climate 
change and bad irrigation infrastructure maintenance and development (USDA 2012).  
In this context, the question of domestic rice availability has become very urgent. Indonesia 
has a large and growing population, with an average annual income of 5200 US dollar per 
capita in 2013 (CIA 2014). According to the World Bank (2014) 43 per cent of Indonesians 
live below $2 a day. Around 40 per cent of the population is dependent directly on 
agriculture. Although the country is the world's third largest rice producer, it is also the 
world's seventh rice importer (USDA 2012). Soon it will be the world's largest sugar 
importer, larger than the EU (GAIN 2014).  
In 2012 the OECD published a report about agricultural policy in Indonesia, recommending 
opening up agriculture for (foreign) business investment, which it argued would contribute to 
expansion of the cultivated areas, increasing the efficiency of production and the use of 
improved technology that might be adapted to face climate variability and climate extremes 
(OECD 2012). This accords with a free trade analysis that suggests Indonesia should export 
where it has comparative advantage – for example in oil palm production – and import where 
it is disadvantaged or faces limitations – for instance in rice production. The problem for 
policy makers is that this leaves the country dependent on the international market where rice 
is only a thinly traded commodity.  
In addition, a populist nationalist discourse suggests that Indonesia is an agrarian nation that 
should not have to import rice. Therefore, the Indonesian government avoids pursuing 
policies that would make rice provision dependent on the international market. By advocating 
a market based approach, the OECD report heated the political debate in Indonesia around 
food security. The suggestion that Indonesia, an ‘agrarian country’, might depend on imports 
of basic food commodities insulted national pride. Populist politicians rallied against these 
‘western neo-liberal’ solutions for improving food security and instead appealed to their 
constituency by emphasizing national food sovereignty. In the run up to the general elections 
in 2014, rice farmers constituted a large bloc of voters, and politicians expected their populist 
appeals about food security to be highly effective. Conversely, in the past urban protests 
against high food prices have toppled political regimes.  
 
Food Law aiming at National Self-sufficiency 
 
After the re-election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009, the national cabinet 
established 11 priorities for his second term, listing food security as the fifth priority. 
Subsequently the president established national targets, and state planners then set out targets 
for five key commodities, including a target to increase rice production by 10 million tons 
and almost double sugar production by 2014 (see table 1). Such an increase would require 
expansion into production areas. 
PRE-­‐COPYEDITED	  VERSION	   9	  
Table 1. Projected growth of the five priority food commodities for national self sufficiency. 
 
Commodity Production in 
2009 (million ton) 
Target 2014 
(million ton) 
Average growth 
per year (%)  
Rice 64.4 75.70 3,5 
Corn 17.6 29,00 12.9 
Soybean 
 
0,97 2,70 35.4 
Sugar  
 
2,6 5,70 23.4 
Beef 
 
0,41 0,55 7,0 
Source: OECD (2012, 135). 
 
Pursuant of this objective, in November 2012 the Parliament passed the new Food Act. In 
general, such a piece of legislation is a product of a complicated process of horse-trading, 
with the consequence that the text is a compromise, presenting a rather general policy 
framework that reflects the concerns of the key stakeholders. The chairman of the 
parliament's commission that prepared the bill noted: 
The OECD’s view is incorrect. The formulation of this bill shows that we are still 
committed to food sovereignty, independence and resilience. We are an independent 
country that can determine our own policies without intervention from other countries 
or organizations. (Jakarta Post 2012) 
 
Also from the order in the articles in the Law we can read the political priorities.1 First is 
national food sovereignty (kedaulatan) defined as the right of the state and nation to establish 
an independent food policy; second is (kemandirian pangan) food self-sufficiency used as 
argument for import substitution. Third is food security (ketahanan pangan), defined as 
availability and including the quality criterion that it should not conflict with religion, belief 
or culture. Fourth is food safety (keamanan pangan). Only later articles consider the problem 
of food insecurity (kerawanan pangan), framed in terms of the shortages caused by logistics, 
or natural or incidental factors, for which food aid is seen as the natural solution. 
Thus the law incorporates competing and mutually incompatible frameworks: the food 
sovereignty concept advanced by critics of the world food system, the food security concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Bill of the Republic of Indonesia, number 18 of 2012, concerning Food. Available from: 
http://www.doa.go.th/psco/images/News/FOOD-LAW-NO-18-2012_ENG_PRESIDENT-SIGNED.pdf, 
accessed on 6 August 2014.	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embedded in mainstream aid and development frameworks, and the nationalist food self-
sufficiency agenda widely criticized by the advocates of market based approaches. Further, 
the law does not reflect an analysis of structural political-economic causes of food insecurity 
for certain categories within the population.  
In the cases that we will now discuss it will become clear that local level (district) 
governments have become more powerful since decentralisation in 2001. They have a crucial 
role in granting companies permits to start a business or a plantation in their territory. The 
district governments are eager to attract investments hoping they will provide employment 
opportunities, increased economic activity, and consequently increased tax income for the 
government. Given their control over agricultural budgets, extension services and other key 
implementing agencies, district governments also have primary responsibility for 
implementing agricultural development policy. The case studies examine the gap between 
local level dilemmas, and the national policies and legislation that are supposed to address 
those dilemmas.  
 
Rice or Oil Palm in North Sumatra  
While North Sumatra is a historical center of plantation development in Indonesia, there are 
also large areas of lowland rice in the province. However, over recent years farmers have 
gradually converted rice land into oil palm gardens despite government policy that prohibits 
this (Law 41/2009). In addition, thousands of small scale rice producers are selling their land 
to planters for growing oil palm. The net effect of these two developments is that rice 
production in this area has been declining. Even the Simalungun district government's 
regulation forbidding the conversion of rice lands could not prevent such developments in 
practice. One farmer noted that the water was becoming insufficient for growing two rice 
crops per year, while 'oil palm farmers can harvest every two weeks’.2 However, after he had 
converted three quarters of a hectare of irrigated rice land to oil palm, he could not afford to 
buy rice all through the year from his oil palm production. Since 2001-2007 the price of 
inputs such as fertilizer has increased, increasing the net cost of production. At the same time 
farmers obtain low prices at the farm gate. Indeed, the terms of trade (the prices of 
agricultural outputs relative to the prices of agricultural inputs) for rice cultivators have 
deteriorated. Meanwhile farmers have witnessed the palm oil boom, where the terms of trade 
of palm oil remain much higher.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Interview with author 3 during workshop in 2012	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Table 2.Terms of trade index for farmers in North Sumatra  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average (%) 
Net terms of trade 
for food crop 
cultivation 
93.1 96.2 98.4 99.9 99.5 100.3 97 
Net terms of trade 
for small holder oil 
palm cultivation 
105.4 101.7 105.6 107.9 106.6 100.2 105 
Source: BPS North Sumatra (2014, 48). 
 
Farmers are becoming increasingly vulnerable to extreme climate events. Degraded 
watershed systems and poor irrigation exacerbate the problems of floods and droughts 
causing rice harvests to decrease. As figure 1 based on data concerning 701,330 households 
indicates, the majority of farmers possess small areas of land, less than 2 hectares.  
 
Figure 1: Division of land ownership (hectares) among farm households (percentage) in 
North Sumatra, in 2009. 
 
 
Source: BPS North Sumatra (2011) 
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At present only 40 percent of rice producing areas are irrigated, leaving farmers susceptible 
to the vagaries of the climate (BPS North Sumatra (2011). This also reduces the frequency of 
planting. Meanwhile the price stabilization system does not work effectively to protect prices 
at the farmer level. These factors have affected the ability of farmers to plant during the dry 
season. Consequently the planting index has stagnated on a level of 1.6.  
 
Table 3. Rice Planting Index (number of crop cycles per year) in North Sumatra 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 
Source: BPS North Sumatra 2014 
 
The farmers in North Sumatra, who convert to oil palm, are what Indonesian policy makers 
call petani gurem, smallholders with rice field areas of less 0.5 ha. In other words they have 
insufficient land to attain sustainable livelihoods from rice production alone. At the time they 
make land use decisions, farmers often do not realise that the price of palm oil fluctuates 
sharply and that oil palm requires expensive inputs to be cultivated profitably (Zen et al. 
2005; McCarthy 2010). As their oil palm lands are so small and their production remains low, 
particularly during the period before the oil palm comes fully into production, they are highly 
vulnerable to price shocks and family crises. Farmers who embark on land conversion 
become highly dependent on the market for buying food, and increasingly susceptible to a 
reproduction crisis, endangering the continuation of their household farming livelihood, 
which can force them into selling the land. In the end many sell their lands and are forced 
into becoming plantation labor or migrating to the city. Consequently the squeeze on rice 
farming and the transition to oil palm drive land conversion which in turn decreases the 
extent of harvested land, reducing the effectiveness of efforts to increase net rice production. 
The local government cannot do much about these developments. While one law (law 
12/1992 concerning agricultural cultivation systems) protects the rights of farmers to choose 
the crop they wish to plant, another more recent law aims at protecting land use for food 
production (law 41/2009). When farmers choose to cultivate oil palm, the district government 
does not have the power to enforce law 41/2009 to prevent land use conversion. In this case 
the market is stronger than the state with its contradictory legislation.  
 
Sugarcane or subsistence crops in Sumba  
We now turn to a second case. Here a development involving large scale sugarcane 
cultivation is replacing subsistence agriculture in Sumba, one of the poorest and most 
sparsely populated islands of Eastern Indonesia. This development supports the national goal 
of achieving self-sufficiency in sugar (see table 1). However Sumba is an island the National 
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Food Security Atlas classified as 'most vulnerable to food insecurity’, in terms of nutritional 
standards (NTT Government et al. 2011). That Atlas indicates that more than half of the 
children in the planned sugarcane area are chronically undernourished. A World Food 
Program survey of nearly 600 households in West Sumba has found that 36 percent were 
'food insecure', with another 35 per cent classified as ‘vulnerable’ (World Food Program 
2010, 42). Sumba is an island of 11,000 km2, administratively divided into 4 autonomous 
districts, with a population of approximately 700,000 persons. Although the island has had a 
long history of plans for plantation development, there are only a few plantations in operation 
(McCarthy, Vel and Afiff 2012). 
Growing demand from the food and beverage industry provides an incentive for increasing 
sugarcane cultivation and building new sugar refineries. However, the national government 
introduced a barrier with Presidential Regulation No. 36/2010 which requires new and 
expanding sugar refineries to create new sugarcane plantations in order to supply the new 
capacity. It is against this policy background that the Wilmar Group, a Singapore based 
agribusiness conglomerate, entered a new production area, Sumba, in 2011. The 
conglomerate conducted their operations through the Indonesian registered subsidiary 
company PT ARN. This company's activity is sugar cane cultivation, whereas sugar milling, 
refinery and trade are principally activities of other subsidiaries within the conglomerate that 
are not present in Sumba. Milling (technology), for example, is the specialism of the 
Australian company Sucrogen that the conglomerate purchased in 2011 (Wilmar 2012). 
Within three years the conglomerate that formerly was known as one of the largest palm oil 
companies in Asia has become a key player in the highly competitive world sugar market 
(Terazono 2013). PT ARN is just the small visible part of a very powerful conglomerate. 
Local actors negotiate with this company's representatives, without further knowledge of the 
company' background.3 In the western part of the island the district government issued an 
initial permit to this company for 25,000 ha of agricultural land. The area destined for sugar 
cane covers around 40 percent of the district's total area suitable for agriculture. Currently 
part of it is being cultivated with food crops, for subsistence and for sale, including export to 
other areas in Indonesia, and partly used as grazing land for livestock. It is home to around 
300,000 people, of which more than 80 percent depend on agriculture for their livelihood 
(BPS-NTT 2012).  
Following the business model of the sugar company the local landowners are being 
dispossessed and will become dependent on the market for buying food. They will receive a 
yearly harvest payment proportional to their 'land contribution', in which both the yield level 
and the price per unit is determined by the company. It remains unclear who is entitled to 
claim land ownership, principally because the land is mostly common clan property. 
Moreover, due to internal clan differentiation, the landlords receiving compensation 
payments are not necessarily the farmers who actually depend on access to the land for their 
livelihood. The local PT ARN staff entered the field and negotiated with the population. They 
provided information about the proposed activities to the farmers and their families, most of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Observation of author 1 during two field visits to Sumba in 2011 and 2012, not just pertaining to PT ARN, but 
also to other agribusiness companies that were negotiating about land acquisition on the island.	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whom did not have any other source of information. There was no NGO representing the 
interests of the farmers, or explaining to farmers abstract concepts like 'lease for 35 years', or 
'calculated land owner's share of the average sugar cane yield'. The farmers were yet to 
comprehend the enormous size and capital power of the agribusiness conglomerate that is 
behind this plantation. Consequently the land transactions did not accord with principles of 
fair, prior and informed consent as widely promoted by the international policy community 
for large scale land transactions of this type (Colchester et al. 2007). 
 
Figure 2. For the indicated coastal strip the sugar cane company held a location permit in 
2011. Photo: Jacqueline Vel, October 2012. 
 
 
 
The company promised that local people would be employed during the harvesting season, 
and for other casual work that requires manual labour. In June 2012 it employed around 300 
people for work on nurseries and land preparation. The company promised to construct 
irrigation facilities which could also be used by adjacent farmers for their food production; 
the company would produce electricity from sugarcane waste. It would commence a 
corporate social responsibility program offering local youth an education trajectory. 
According to the company's model, the sugarcane plantation would be a motor for economic 
growth and would lead to a thriving local economy, with the local population using the 
income they earn as labourers in the sugar sector for investing in productive enterprises. The 
discursive power of this narrative is strong and it convinced the district government. Key 
local stakeholders and opinion leaders joined in a field visit to Lampung where PT Gunung 
Madu Plantations has been operating a sugar cane plantation since 1975. In 2012, the first 
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landowners in the area planned for sugar cane handed over the rights to their land for 35 
years (one and a half generations). They received a compensation payment from PT ARN of 
660 US $ per hectare for the total period, which is an amount that, for example, equals 7 
times the regional monthly minimum wage. 
Despite this successful start, the company encountered serious trouble. First was the refusal 
by the district government of an adjacent district in Sumba to provide a location permit, 
which cancelled the option of further expansion. The Head of the Agricultural Service 
explained that he refused it, because 'they will use all first quality land in the district'.4 Instead 
he preferred protecting subsistence agriculture, in particular maize cultivation, which at that 
time was the provincial priority agricultural policy. The decision to refuse permission to the 
sugarcane company was also justified with food security arguments. Sugarcane would replace 
food crops, which is hard to support given that this island is one of the most food-insecure 
areas of the country. Moreover, as the study of the World Food Programme (2010) indicated, 
the dry land farmers are among the most vulnerable and food insecure in this province. Here 
corn and other root crops are critical to family diets. Most farmers own their land, and 
cultivate as much as they can manage. While this helps greatly, farmers face climate 
variability, poor soils, and live in a state of rural underdevelopment.  
In the district where the company obtained the location permit, the land acquisition process 
moved too slowly. By the end of 2013 the company had only around 900 hectares covered by 
signed agreements with landowners. Company staff explained that they would need at least 
9000 hectares to be able to start up their business and meet the requirements of the 
Presidential Regulation No. 36/2010 about mandatory areas of new production for any new 
sugar mill. Local informants explained that many landowners started doubting the benefits of 
handing over their land to the sugar company when critical voices started spreading 
competing narratives about the future under the sugar company's regime. Political campaigns 
for the district head elections in 2013 created the context for emerging counter narratives. 
The company had been collaborating well with the incumbent district head who was therefore 
associated with sugar industry plans. His opponent won the elections; however his victory 
was questioned when he was accused of fraud. Then, violence broke out between the 
supporters of the two camps and some people were killed. This political instability 
deteriorated the business climate for the sugar company and made them postpone the decision 
to build a sugar mill.  	  
Conclusions  
These cases demonstrate the conflicted nature of food policy, leading to outcomes that vary 
across scale and space. At the national level, notions of food security, food self-sufficiency 
and food sovereignty get conflated in a simplified policy discussion. Political players at the 
center of the political debate mobilize a self-sufficiency concept as an 'ideational source of 
power' in political debates. For nationalist notions of food self sufficiency remain highly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Interview with author 1 Waihibur, October 2011.	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potent within the political domain. Rice and sugar self sufficiency remain issues that give 
political actors leverage, providing discursive power and setting the terms for the 
development of policies, norms and procedures shaping agricultural and food policy. As 
Indonesia’s self-sufficiency in rice and sugar becomes a matter of national prestige, other 
pressing questions are eclipsed. For instance the distinction between successful domestic 
production of food, achieving local food self-sufficiency, and the need to ensure access to 
food for poor households: this critical issue is too easily lost from the political debate. 
Meanwhile, even in rural areas, the majority of people who are net food buyers remain 
vulnerable to price fluctuations. At the same time, the rice price remains above world prices, 
while farmers continue to obtain low farm gate prices. In this way, given low state budget 
provisions for helping the poor and for assisting farming, the question of developing and 
implementing policies to support vulnerable populations tends to move down the policy 
agenda. Meanwhile many rural people face encompassing entitlement failures. For instance, 
the 2009 Food Security Atlas for Indonesia shows that the national prevalence of stunting 
(chronic malnutrition) remained high at 36.8%, with 167 out of 346 districts having a very 
high prevalence of stunting (above 40%).5  
At the same time, powerful investors mobilise ideas and productivist narratives to attempt to 
set the political agenda. Nationally they assert that sugar plantation development that 
involves large scale highly capital intense cultivation of the crop will support national goals 
of self-sufficiency in the most efficient manner, mobilizing the idea of the creativity of the 
private sector. The sugar and palm oil conglomerate utilizes knowledge about the potentials 
of crops and possible future scenarios of local economic development to shape the decision 
making process. Locally, the sugar company legitimizes plantation development by 
promoting the employment opportunities and financial outcomes that will be provided for by 
investment, despite the fact that it involves the large scale displacement of farmers. The 
injection of material resources by these agribusiness investors remains attractive to regional 
governments in this marginal region.  
In contrast, rice farmers in North Sumatra are disadvantaged by their poor knowledge of the 
economics of oil palm farming. At the same time they lack the capacity to invest in 
agricultural production, even while they are squeezed by a range of factors including the 
micro-economic dynamics shaping rice farming, the deterioration of rice irrigation facilities, 
and the impact of climate change. In contrast, apparently marginal and disempowered farmers 
in Sumba effectively block the Wilmar behemoth. They claim customary rights to the land, 
refusing to sign release papers, and extending their control over the most crucial natural 
resource in food production: agricultural land.  
In conclusion we see specific material and ideational, actor-specific and structural factors 
shaping this conflicted policy field. Food policy is not a single policy field but rather a policy 
space driven by a range of internally conflicting, related questions that policy makers need to 
address. The productivist approach of twentieth century food policy focused on food 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Food Security Council, Department of Agriculture, World Food Programme (2009) A Food Insecurity and 
Vulnerability Atlas of Indonesia 2009 http://www.foodsecurityatlas.org/idn/country/fsva-2009/executive-
summary.	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availability, investment in science, industrial scale inputs, and farm infrastructure to increase 
production, under state tutelage. Now, food policy necessarily needs to focus on re-
establishing the links between ecology, equity and health. As Lang (2010) notes, this entails 
delivering sufficiency of production in ecological, social and economic terms. The shift 
towards more equitable and environmentally sound approaches to food will entail moving 
beyond a single-minded pursuit of self-sufficiency targets to focus directly on addressing the 
entitlement failures that remain all too common in rural Indonesia.  
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